“Robot safety no longer ends at the safety fence.”

André Hetzke: Since 2011, industrial robotics – including mobile robotics – has advanced significantly. Today, robots are more interconnected, are increasingly configured via software, and collaborate more closely with other machines, digital systems, and people. ISO 10218:2025 reflects this technological shift and the current state of the art. 

The new edition clarifies existing requirements and introduces additional safety functions. These include, among other things, expanded requirements for safe speed monitoring, manual operation at high speed T2, the single point of control, and start and restart interlocks. In addition, new safety functions have been introduced, such as the “Normal Stop”.

André Hetzke: The standard applies to manufacturers of industrial robots, system integrators, and operators. Each party has a different responsibility: The manufacturer is responsible for the robot product, the integrator for the safe design and conformity of the complete robot system, and the operator for safe operation and the controlled management of changes to the system.

Companies should first distinguish between three situations:

• For new systems, it must be determined which legal, normative, and contractual requirements apply at the time of placing on the market or commissioning.
• For existing systems, it is important to document which control and software versions are in use and what changes are planned for the future.
• For retrofits, it must be determined whether new hazards arise or existing risks are increased.

In addition, companies should take into account the requirements of their target markets and customer contracts. ISO 10218 is applicable internationally but is regionally adapted, for example as EN ISO 10218 in Europe or via ANSI/A3 R15.06 in the U.S. Customers may also already require compliance with the new standard through requirements specification or contracts.

André Hetzke: Existing systems do not need to be replaced or completely reassessed solely because a new standard has been published, since they have already been placed on the market. In principle, they can continue to be operated as long as they are safe, properly maintained, and not significantly modified. Even replacing a component with a newer version, performing a repair, using replacement parts, or simply improving the user interface does not, as a rule, automatically constitute a significant modification. A new or supplementary risk assessment becomes necessary when changes are made to the system. In particular, the following must be examined:

• Are new hazards arising?
• Are existing risks increasing?
• Can these risks be sufficiently reduced through existing or simple additional protective measures?
• Do the intended use or essential functions of the equipment change?

André Hetzke: A Cobot —a term that, incidentally, is not defined in the standard but was coined by the industry— is not automatically a safe collaborative application. The standard addresses industrial robots, which include cobots and accordingly are treated under regulations. Whether an application can be operated without a separating protective device depends on the risk assessment of the entire system.

Among other factors, the tool, the workpiece, potential contact points, forces, pressures, speeds, motion sequences, and the specific interaction between humans and robots must be taken into account.

The updated ISO 10218 places greater emphasis on requirements for human-robot collaboration. However, the specific safe design remains the responsibility of the system integrator. The decision of “safety fence or no safety fence” must therefore not be made solely based on the robot model used.

Stefan Schleipen: Industrial automation is based on increasingly interconnected components in ever more complex production facilities. Robots communicate with machines, engineering systems, service applications, and higher-level production systems. This interconnectivity creates new opportunities but can also open up additional points of vulnerability for cybercriminals.

With production facilities, it’s not just about protecting data. Cyberattacks can lead to production downtime, manipulated processes, or safety risks. If an attack can, for example, influence operating modes, motion parameters, or safety-related configurations, cybersecurity immediately becomes a matter of physical safety.

That is why functional safety and cybersecurity are increasingly converging. Functional safety protects against dangerous technical malfunctions. Cybersecurity protects systems against, among other things, unauthorized access or intentional manipulation. To ensure safe plant operation today, both areas must be considered together.

André Hetzke: ISO 10218:2025 requires a cybersecurity threat analysis if cyber threats could affect the safe operation of the robot. If such risks are identified, appropriate measures must be put in place to protect against unauthorized access to the control system as well as to safety-critical hardware and software.

Stefan Schleipen: From a technical standpoint, this involves, among other things, controlled and authenticated access, protected communication interfaces, secure software updates, and the protection of safety-critical functions.

However, an effective security strategy encompasses more than just the product itself. Operators should appropriately segment machine and corporate networks, clearly define roles and access rights, avoid unnecessary services and connections, and secure remote access. In addition, they should follow the manufacturers’ security guidelines and establish data backup and recovery processes.

Cybersecurity is not a one-time measure taken during commissioning. It must be actively implemented and continuously developed throughout the system’s entire lifecycle.

André Hetzke: The Cyber Resilience Act, or CRA for short, establishes binding cybersecurity requirements in the EU for products with digital elements. This includes also networked industrial hardware and software products. Whether a specific product falls under the CRA must be assessed based on its functions, intended use, and possible exemptions. In the future, manufacturers must systematically address cybersecurity throughout the product lifecycle. This includes, among other things, a cybersecurity risk assessment, secure product development, technical documentation, vulnerability management, security updates, and defined reporting requirements.

The ISO 10218, the Machinery Regulation, and the CRA complement one another in this regard: ISO 10218 primarily addresses cybersecurity where it affects the functional safety of the robot and the robot system. The Machinery Regulation requires, among other things, the protection of safety-related functions against corruption. The CRA also sets comprehensive cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements throughout their lifecycle.

Stefan Schleipen: Security updates and structured vulnerability management are therefore central components of a modern security strategy. Vulnerabilities must be continuously identified, assessed, and remedied. Relevant security information must be communicated to customers, and necessary updates must be provided.

Operators, for their part, need standardized processes to evaluate updates, test them, install them during appropriate maintenance windows, and document them in a traceable manner. In industrial plants, it is always essential to consider the potential impact an update may have on production, the application, and validated safety functions.